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In the Sttprenie Co11rt of the
State of Utah
SHERMAN JONES, MERLE JONES,
~~
BRYANT JONES and LARAINE JONES,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
ALVIE L. THORVALDSON, E. NOREEN
THORVALDSON, MERRILL OLDRO·YD
and 0. THAYNE ACORD,
Defendants and Respondents.

CASE
\

NO. 10043

)

RESPONDENTs· BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action commenced by Plaintiffs, lessees, for

declaratory interpretation of a document upon which part
of a lease agreement was founded and a counterclaim by
the lessors for termination of the said lease agreement for
failure of consideration and for breach of contract. The
defendants, in the alternative, cross-claimed against defendants Oldroyd and Acord for damages.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. The Trial Court declared the disputed document a revokable license and dismissed the Defendants' cross-claims against Oldroyd and
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Acord. The Court determined that the Plaintiffs had by
their conduct forfeited the lease. From this judgment the
Plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirmance of the judgment of the
Trial Court and additional award of attorneys fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent feels it is essential to restate the facts
in their brief in order that the Court may have a more
complete picture of the sequences and background to this
particular litigation. Prior to December 11, 1957, the Defendants, Thorvaldson, owned and operated a gravel and
sand deposit in the southern end of Utah County between
the city of Spring Lake and Santaquin. The sand and
gravel deposits were located on the side of the mountain
southeast of U S. Highway 91, and the property itself
fronted on U. S. Highway 91. It was an irregular piece,
containing approximately 40 acres of land. In addition to
this property, the Thorvaldsons occupied and operated a
gravel pit owned by Merrill Oldroyd, under an oral agreement to do so. This gravel pit is known as the Oldroyd
or Acord gravel pit in the present litigation and transcript.

Prior to December 11, 1957, the plaintiffs and defendants, Thorvaldson, negotiated for the sale of the defendants' ready-mix concrete business and the leasing of the
property from which the sand and gravel was extracted.
The plaintiffs were represented by Elden Elliason, their attorney, and the defendants, Thorvaldson, were represented by Allen L. Hodgson.
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In order to make the lease from Thorvaldsons to Jones,
it was necessary for a written document to be obtained,

spt"Cifying the right that Thorvaldson had of the Oldroyd
property. For this reason, Mr. Hodgson drew an agreement dated December 9, 1957 entitled "Consent and Agreement", and which was attached as Exhibit B to the plaintiff's petition for declaratory judgment herein. This agreement, together with the property owned by Thorvaldsons
was leased to the Jones under a document entitled "Contract Assignment and Lease Agreement". Mr. Elliasoo.
drew the said agreement and at a later date, in his office,
Mr. Hodgson approved its form for the defendants, Thorvaldson. This portion of the trial has not been transcribed,
but in the opinion of the Respondent, it is essential for an
understanding of the issues herein.
During the year 1958 and prior to December 8, 1858,
the Jones and Thorvaldsons had many disagreements concerning the operation of the property and their obligations
under the agreement. They finally resorted 1n litigation
and on December 8, 1958, a complaint was filed by Alvie
L. Thorvaldson and E. Noreen Thorvaldson against the
Jones. At this time, Mr. Hodgson represented the Thorvald.sons and suit was brought to evict the defendants for
breach of contract. This case was filed as Civil No. 21419
in the District Court of Utah County, State of Utah. This
was a complicated proceeding and numerous amendments
were made and numerous counter-claims were filed; however, eventually a counter-claim was filed, wherein the
lease was requested to be reformed in order to properly
describe the property which the defendants in that action
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clrumed they had leased by adding to the description an
additional thirty acres.

In that particular case, the plaintiffs raised the question of illusory consideration or failure of consideration
claiming that under the lease agreement, the Jones had
no requirements to take any certain quantity or any quantity at all of sand and gravel from the properties leased.
At that time, they, the Jones, were hauling sand and gravel
on to the property leased and manufacturing the concrete
and selling sand and gravel to others and not paying Thorvaldson any compensation for such conduct. A perusal
of the lease will show that the only compensation to be
paid Thorvaldson is 25c a yard for sand, gravel and topsoil mined, and 1c a yard for fill dirt removed from the
premises. The court reformed the contract, adding the
additional property requested by defendants, but requiring
the defendants, Jones, to pay 25c a yard for all materials
"processed on" the, property. It was the interpretation
and oontemplation of the court that the Jones would continue their operation on the property and that if the words
"processed on" were interpreted as being in the agreement
or was impliedly part of the agreement, that the lease
would then not be defective (R. 115). In fact, in that
case, counsel for the defendants, Mr. Young wrote a brief,
wherein he agreed with the court as follows:

"We agree that if the lease merely permitted the lessees to hold the premises and sell no sand, gravel and
topsoil, it would be invalid." (R. 112)
On that basis, the court, in its findings of fact and decree, stated:
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"Defendants are ordered to pay a royalty of 25c per
cubic yard for all topsoil, sand and gravel processed
on or produced from the premises leased by the plaintiffs to defendants and disposed upon the market."
'J1he word "on" was added so that the lease read "proces..~ on or produced from."
This made the lease valid
and meaningful provided the Jooeses intended to obtain
thPir material from the Thorvaldson property.
Subsequent to the decree orf the court, the Jones people
moved their operation to property adjacent to that leased.
They purchased five acres of land, sufficient for the operation of the concrete batch plant, and commenced operation, doing the same thing that they had done before on
the operation of the Thorvaldson prope1rty, but since the
plant was now operated on their own property immediately
adjacent to Thorvaldson prope1rty, they paid nothing and
have paid nothing to the Thorvaldsons for sand and gravel
11
processed" on their OiWil property which did not come
from the 'I'horvaldson pits. Mr. Jones, in his testimony,
stated as follows:
Mr. Jones, I want to read to you from your deposition - first of all, I'll ask you if you didn't testify under oath on the 29th day of October, 1962, did you?
A. That's right.
Q. Now, I will call your attention to page 21, line
28, and read these questions and answers from the deposition as follows:
Q.

"At the time of the last court hearing, were you
manufacturing concrete on his property?
A. No, I don't believe- yes, we were manufacturing it on his property.
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Q. Since then you have moved your batch plant
to your own property?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. Now, you manufacture only on your property, is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q. Y oo. don't pay any royalty on that material
you process and manufacture on your own property?
A. Only that that we remorve from his property.
Q. Only that which you obtain from the property which you leased from Mr. Thorvaldson?
A. Right.
Q. Do you have any requirement to take any
material from Mr. Thorvaldson's property?
A. You mean a determined amount?
Q. Yes.
A. No, there is no determined amount.
Q. You can take what you need?
A. That is right."

Now, this was your testimony, wasn't it?
A. That's right.
(R. 316, Line 5 toR. 317, Line 8)
In the spring of 1962, Mr. Oldroyd sold a great quantity of his property to Mr. Thayne Acord, and included
within the sale was the property that had been used by
Thorvaldson and the Jones under the agreement called
14
Contract Assignment and Lease Agreement". The Jones'
arranged with Mr. Acord to pay Acord for the gravel removed from this property, the sum of lOc a yard as dis-
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t inguished from the 25c they had been paying Thorvald-

son for the same material. Thorvaldsons told Jones, Acord
and Oldroyd that they would not recognize such contract
and required that Jones pay them for the material mined
from the Oldroyd property. Furthermore, there had been
a series of breaches of contracts by the Jones people and
on the 24th day of August, 1962, the defendants in this case,
Thorvaldson. served upon the plaintiffs, Jones, in this
case, a notice to quit (R. 27), specifying eight breaches
of contract and requiring that said breaches be remedied
and the said defaults be paid within five days from the
date of service or an action would be brought for treble
damages and for possession of the property. No performance was received to this notice ~t that on August
29, 1962, the Jones filed with the Fourth District Court
a petition for declaratory judgment requesting that the
Court interpret the document entitled "Consent and Agreement", which had been prepared by Mr. Hodgson. Mr.
Hodgson, at this time, represented the plaintiffs, Jones.
Thorvaldson filed an answer, counter-claim and crossclaim against Merrill Oldroyd and Thayne Acord so that
the respective rights of the parties could be litigated in
one proceeding.
In the counter-claim, the defendants alleged action in
unlawful detainer, that the Contract Assignment and Lease
Agreement was void because it was inocmplete, indefinite
and too uncertain for enforcement, that there was mutual
mistake on the part of the parties as to twelve conditions
that must have been considered by the parties, that there
was a complete lack of consideration because of lack of
mutuality of obligation, that in the alternative, the con-
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tract ~should be reformed to conform with the true intent
of the parties. Then the cross-complaint was filed against
Oldroyd for damages. Denials were filed and upon these
issues, the matter went to trial.
The court concluded that the agreement between Thorvaldson ·and Oldroyd was a revokable licence and that Oldroyd had elected to revoke the same, thereby reducing the
property in which Thorvaldson had a right of royalty. This
decision eliminated Oldroyd and Acord from the litigation.
The litigation then went forward on the defendants'
counter-claim and the plaintiffs' answer. The ~court, in
its memorandum decision (R. 65) and in the findings of
fact (R. 67) formd that the plaintiffs had violated their
lease with Thorvaldsoo in the following particulars:
A. Failed to remove ovevburden on the sand and
gravel pit on the leased premises.
B. Failed to make sales slips for materials sold reasonably soon after sale and delivery of materials to
customers.

C. Removal and stockpiling of sand and gravel from
the leased premises off the premises without accounting therefor.
D. Abandonment of the business of selling sand and
gravel on the leased premises.
E. Removal of the business formally conducted from
the leased premises.
E. Failure to acco·unt foc sand and gravel removed
from the premises and for which payment has not
been made.
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On the basis above stated, the court found that the
plaintiffs had forfeited the lease and that defendants had
elected and have heretofore declared the forfeiture as p~
vided for in the lease. The court also found that the defendants were entitled to one thousand dollars for attorney's fees and the defendants, Thorvaldson, were directed
to prepare the findings of fact.
During the course of the trial, the Plaintiffs, Jones,
associated with Mr. Hodgson, Dave McMullin as <&attorney. Af1Pr the findings of fact, judgment and decree were
Pntered, Mr. Hodgson withdrew, and Mr. Dallas H. Young
was associated as counsel for the plaintiffs. Mr. Young
and Mr. McMullin had appeared as counsel for Jones when
they were defendants in the prior oase. The case of Thorvaldson vs. Jones, Civil No. 21419, was called to the court's
attention and the court took judicial lmowledge of that
case. That case has been forwarded to the Supreme Court
as part of the transcript herein.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
THE CONSIDERATION FOR THE AGREEMENT EN-

TITLED CONTRACT ASSIGNMENT AND LEASE
AGREEMENT WAS ILLUSORY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
As we have stated in the statement of facts, it was
contemplated by all of the parties at the time of the previous litigation that Jones would pay Thorvaldson a royalty of so much per ton for materials "produced and/or
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process€d" on the property. The language was not a part
of the agreement, however, counsel for the plaintiffs in the
previous litigation had insisted that this was the intent
of the parties and the court had interpreted the contract
on the previous litigation to read "processed on" rather
than "processed from" in <mier to satisfy the requirement
of mutuality of obligation. It was the position of the
Jones in that case that there could be no lack of consideration if the contract were interpreted to require them
to pay for material brought on the property and processed.
thereon. Without that language in the contract, the court
would have forfeited the lease on the previous occasion
for failure of consideration (R. 112). Both Mr. Young
in the previous case and in his brief therein (R. 112) and
Mr. Hodgson in the present case and in his brief therein
( (R. 112) stated respectively as follows:
"Mr. Young: 'May we call attention to the fact that
is not a contract which gives the lessees the right to
hold the premises and to sell no sand, gravel and top..
soil. We concede that such a lease would be invalid"
"Mr. Hodgson: 'We agree that if the lease merely permitted the lessees to hold the premises and to sell no
sand, gravel and topsoil, it would be invalid."
"Mr. Young: "It is true, as a general rule, that if it
is wholly optional with one party to a bilateral agreement, whether he shall perform or not, there is no
legal contract. The promise of that party in such a
barg·ain is illusory, that is though in form a promise,
it is so qualified that the promissor really engages
himself for nothing and his illusory promise is insufficient consideration to support a counter promise. A
promise to buy such quantity of goods as the buyer
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may thereafter order or to take goods in such quantities 'as may be desired', or as the buyer 'may want',
is not sufficient consideration since the buyer may refrain from buying at his option and without incurring
legal detriment himself or benefiting the other party.
• • • Even a promise to buy or sell only as much
as the promissor chooses is a sufficient consideration
for a counter promise when coupled with the agreement that whatever the buyer or seller choose to buy
or sell, he will buy or sell to the promisee.
To put the matter another way-the promise of a seller not to manufacture except for the buyer or the
promise of a buyer not to buy except from a particular seller is clearly a promise to do something detrimental." (Emphasis added)
In Mr. Young's brief, the Jones were arguing that
their duty and obligation was to buy exclusively from the
Thorvaldsons in order to overcome the argument that Thorvaldson made at that time that the promise was illusory.
The court concluded that that was the ~act ·and construed
the contract to mean "processed on" as well as produced.
The appellant now contends that they do not have to purchase from Thorvaldsons except quantities "as may bed~
sired or as they "may want". This is the very antithesis
of their prior position and was well known by the court in
ad<iresmng Mr. Hodgson concerning the matter as quoted
above. (R. 112, 113)
Both attorneys for the defendants, Jones, admit that
the lease would be invalid, and yet, the very facts that they
state would cause it to be invalid are present in this case.
Testimony of Mr. Jones himself has been quoted in ·the
statement of facts and he has stated categorically and unequivocably that they do not have any requin:mlent to
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take any material from the Thorvaldson property. That
they can take what they want, o:r not take any, and yet
are able to hold the property for forty years (R. 111, R.
317).
The chief complaint of the appellants herein is that
they claim the court required the appellants to maintain
a batch plant on the property, otherwise there was a forfeiture (Appellant's Brief P. 13). This was not the finding of the court nor the position argued by the Respondent. The court merely stated that they had to operate
their business on the property whether that was the sale
of sand and gravel or the operation of a batch plant or
whatever it was, for it was the contemplation of the parties that the materials for the operation of the business
of the Jones would be obtained from the property of Thorvaldson, otherwise Thorvaldson would get nothing for having leased his property to the Jones for forty years. There
is no attempt to put specific language into the contract,
but merely to interpret the contract according to its explicit intent.
The removal of the plant from the property of the
Thorvaldsons was done deliberately to circumvent the
judgment in the first case and to avoid the payment of
royalties on materials manufactured from other sources,
which constitute the great bulk of the business of the
Joneses (R. 291). The Joneses are taking sand which also
contains a sizeable quantity of gravel, by their own testimony (R. 291) and stockpiling it. When they are making
ooncrete, and if they take material from the pile that they
have stockpiled from the Thorvaldson pit, they pay Thorvaldson a royalty calculated on the basis of three-tenths of
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the eon<.TPtt> sold, it being their theory that three-tenths
is made up of sand, which is principally the material they
get from Thorvaldson's pit, even though they admit that
there is gravel in it. The balance, or seven-tenths, they
<!ssume is made up of gravel, the quantity orf ce~ment added
being absorbed as shrinkage (R. 163). Under the methocts used by the defendants, it is impossible to tell the
quantities of sand and gravel utilized by the appellants that
is owned by the Thorvaldsons. They merely estimate om
the basis that sand of that approximate amount must be
used with each cement batch; however, they cannot account for the amount of the gravel that is contained in
the Thorvaldson material or the sand that is contained in
the matrial received from other sources.
The appellant has cited numerous authorities with
which we do not take serious exception except to say that
they are not applicable to the particular issue ;before this
court. For example, the appellant has cited 51 CJS 683
concerning the necessity for a foreclosure clause, but this
provision only applies in respect to a situation ·where there
is no provision in the lease or statute allowing teimination of tenancy such as our unlawful detainer statute,
Title 38, Chapter 36. In this case we have both contmct
and statutory provision.
There is nothing mysterious
about our rights for rescission in the event of illusory consideration or material breach. We call the court's attention to Williston on Contracts, Sec. 104, 104al and 105a
and particularly to the language contained in those sections as follows:

"And in any case where a promise in terms or in effect provides that the promissor has a right to choose
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one o:.., two alternatives, and by choosing one will es-

cape without suffering a detriment or giving the other
party a benefit, the promise is insufficient co!IlSidera-

tion.''
See also, Amedcan Law Institute Restatement of the
Law of Contrcts, Section 274 concerning failure of consideration as a discharge of duty; Section 275 of the same

citation which concerns rules for determining materiality
of a failure to perform; and Section 277, failure of con-

sideration as a discharge of an e)cisting right or of action.
The American Law Institulte Restatement of the Law of
Contracts, Section 79 states as follows:
"A promise or apparent promise which reserves by its
terms to the promissor the privilege of alternative
courses of conduct is insufficient consideraJtion if any
of these courses of conduct would be insufficient consideration if it alone were bargained for." In its illustrations under Section 79, the restatement sets forth
an example. 3. A offers to deliver B, at two dollars a bushel, as many bushels of wheat not exceeding 5,000 as B may choose to order within the next
30 days. B accepts, agreeing to buy at that price as
much as he shall order of A within the specified time.
B's acceptance involves no promise by him and is not
sufficient consideration.''
Compare that example with the situation here. Joneses
have agreed to purchase from Thorvaldson sand, gravel
and topsoil at the rate of 25c per yard and fill material at
the rate of lc per yard, in such amounts as they may
choose to order, but they may not choose to order any.
Under such cireumstances, the Restatement says the consideration is illusory and unenforceable.
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The Appellant in their argument spend nwnerous pages
attempting to distinguish between covenants and conditions; however, we respectfully suggest that the distinction is not meritorious in this case for there are ample
authorities that state under circumstances of this sort, the
contract must fail. The concluding sentence that summarizes the position of the Appellant is that contained on
page 19 of their brief wherein they state "This is not a
contract where it was wholly optional with the Joneses
whether they should perform or not." Then they quote
Williston on Sales, Volume II, Section 464. We are in harmony with that rule therein stated. We would like the
Appellant to tell use wherein the contract performance
was not wholly optional with Jones. What was there in
the contract that Thorvaldson could compel Jones to do?
The answer to this question will tell the Court whether
the consideration was real or imaginary. We believe that
the only answer to the question is that the consideration
was imaginary, unless the Joneses were willing to have the
contract construed as requiring them to take all of their
material from the property leased from Thorvaldson. Since
they say that that was not their intent and since the contract itself is silent as to this subject and since their attorney, Mr. Elliason, drew that contract, we believe that
it should be most strongly construed against the Jones'
and the interpretation given to it necessarily means that
there was no consideration.
In the case of Washington Chocolate Co. vs. Canterbury Candy Makers, Inc., 138 Pac. 2d, 195, there was a
contract drawn between the parties wherein the Canterbury Candy Makers agreed to purchase from the Washing-
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ton Chocolate Co. "all chocolate used by it at current price
for chocolate at Seattle, Washington, and the same shall
be paid for by the candy company in the ordinary course
of business." The issue in that case was whether or not
theTe was a lack of mutuality because of the indefiniteness
of the contract. The court held that the consideration
was illusory and unenforceruble and declared the contract
null and void.
It is a common rule of law in mineral development
cas2s to require, by implication, that the Lessee utilize
and deve1op the property to its fullest extent; otherwise,
the consideration for the contract fails. Cases in support
of this proposition are found in 76 ALR 2d commencing
with page 710.
In the case of Darr v. Eldridge, 66 New Mexico 260,
346 Pac. 2d 1071, an action was brought to cancel a lease
l>ei!Ween th-e Lessors and the Assignee of the Lessee. It
appears that the premises were leased for the development
qf a mineral water on the basis of a royalty of $100 per
month for the first six months and thereafter a royalty
on the basis of 5c per gallon for the first 4,000 gallons
taken from the well each month. A dispute arose as to
the amount of royalties to be paid for the mineral water
used by the Lessees for the sale of vapor baths. After the
litigation which was in favor of the Lessor, the Lessee
abandoned the well and used city water supplemented
with dry minerals. This practice was continued by the
Assignee. The court held that under such circumstances
the Lessee and his Assignee were bound by an implied
covenant to use reasonable diligence in marketing the
mineral water, and that for breach thereof, cancellation of
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the lease was the appropriate remedy. The court stated
that there were two propositions, to-wit: 1. "Lessors
urge that the Lessee of the mineral well and his Assignee
were bound by an implied covenant to use reasonable diliegnt'P in marketing the mineral wate. We agree." 2.
"Assuming for the moment that the implied covenant was
breached, the question arises whether cancelation will be
decreed for such breach. The general rule in the cae of
ordinary leases is that it will not unless the lease contains
an express proviso to that effect. Shultz vs. Ramey, 64
New Mexco 366, 328 Pac. 2d 937. However, the decisions
holding that cancelation will be decreed for breach of an
implied covenant in oil and gas leases preponderate. Three
Summers Oil and Gas, 453-468 Perm. Ed. Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases, page 362, (Second
edition 1940) . And this is the rule that has been establshed in this jurisdiction. Libby vs. DeBuca, supra, has
heretofore pointed out the lease in question should be governed by the principles applicable to oil and gas leases including the doctrine that such a lease will be canceled for
failure to exercise reasonable diligence in marketing the
product. And such cancelation will be decreed against
the assignee of the lease."
In the case of Crystal George, et al vs. Ardith Jones,
et al, 168 Nebraska 149, 95 Northwest 2d 609, 76 ALR
2d 10, an action was brought against the surviving widow
and administratrix and the heirs at law of the deceased
Lessee, and the person to whom the administratrix had
granted certain rights to remove gravel under the lease
in question for forfeiture and ·cancelation of a mineral lease
and to quiet title to all mineral rights in certain lands of
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the plaintiffs. Under the lease granted to the Lessee for
a five-year term, the Lessee agreed to pay as rental a stated
sum for each cubic yard of gravel removed. The lease
also provided that its terms were binding on the parties,
their executocs, administrators, heirs and assigns. The
plaintiff alleged that since the death of the Lessee the
defendants had taken over and had assumed the lease but
had failed to use any diligence in mining or extracting
gravel and had failed to make reasonable effort to extract
gravel, and although repeatedly warned, they had failed
and refused to continue the efforts to mine and remove
gravel from the premises. The defendants alleged affirmatively that they had diligently sought to operate the
lease since the Lessee's death and that they had difficulty
in keeping the machinery in repair, which fact was known
to the plaintiffs and that she had agreed that any delay
because of such difficulty would nort place defendants in
default. There was a sharp conflict in the evidence on
the material issues. The court found that the lease had
been forfeited that the plaintiffs were entitled to cancelation. The Supreme Court of Nebraska concluded that
forfeiture of the lease was proper for the Lessee breached
the implied covenant which exists in mining leases and
which the only consideration is the agreement by which
the Lessee will pay a royalty on the product mined, that
he will develop and operate the pit with reasonable diligence. The court, in its decision., stated as follows:
"We are cognizant that courts of equity a:bhor
forfeitures, that they are odious in law and not favored by the courts and will nort be enforced unless
the facts which purport to require such drastic ac-
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1ion come clearly and plainly within the provisions
of the law or the lease as the case may be. See Donnelly vs. Soverign Camp WOW 111 Nebraska 499,
197 Northwest 145.
We deem the following authorities applicable to
the factual situation in the instant case."
The court then cited the cases· of Phillips vs. Hamilton, 17 Wyoming 41, H5 Pac. 846, wherein it was held
if the consideration of a lease is a royalty to be paid to
the Lessor on the product of the mine, there is an implied covenant that the work of the prospecting and development shall be prosecuted wifu reasonable diligence.
In Cotner vs. Mundy, 92 Oklahoma 268, 219 Pac. 321,
it was held that where the only consideration for the
lease of sand and gravel pit for a long period of years
was a royalty on the sand and gravel removed and the
lease contained no express provision for continuous operation or for forfeiture for failure to develop and operate the pit, there was an implied covenant on the part of
the Lessee to develop and operate the .pit with reasonable
diligence. See also Freeport Sulphur Co. vs. American
Sulphur Royalty Co., 117 Texas 439, 6 Southwest 2d 1039,
60 ALR 890; Mansfield Gas Company vs. Alexander, 97
Arkansas 167, 133 Southwest 873.
Cases showing the requirement for diligent operation
of percentage leases, even though not mineral, can be
found in 170 ALR at 1107. These cases, although not
cases involving sand, gravel, oil and other minerals, which
cases seem to fall in a category by themselves, also say
in the citations mentioned that failure to operate the business leased so as to give maximum profit to the Lessor
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can constitute a substantial breach for which forfeiture
can be the remedy. The writer herein does not want to
imply that all the cases in 170 ALR excated a f01rfeiture;
hGwever, all of them decided in favor of the Lessor concerning either forfeiture or damages.
A ease that we believe is in oint in our particular
situation is the case of Dickey vs. Philade~phia Minit-Man
Corp., 105 A2d 580. In that case an action was brought
to recove'l' possession of the property leased. The lease
required the Lessee to pay a rental of 12lh% o[ the annual groos sales and charges, but nort less than $1800.00
yearly. 'Dhe agree'lnent also contained language that the
property was ''to be used and occupied by Lessee in the
business of washing and cleanng automobiles and * * *
for no other purpose". The Lessee stopped washing automobHes, although it continued to simonize and polish
automobHes. The Lessor brought an action on the basis
of failure of consideration. The court held for the Lessee; however, the important conside::ration in its decision
was the fact that there was a minimum lease requirement
of $1800.00 per year. The court cited a number of cases
wherein forfeiture was the proper remedy and indicated
that had the defendant "moved any part of his business
to anorther location" or if the lease had nort had a minimum rental provided, then the Court infocred that forfeiture could have been the proper remedy. This we say
is analogoru:s to our situation for here there was no minimum rental or quantity to be taken by the Joneses and
they, in fact, moved their business to orther premises. The
proposition in the instant case is the very proposition
which the court by dicta inferred it would declare a for-
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feiture in the Dickey case. The Respondent also cites
the court to the dissenting opinion in the Dickey case
wherein the minority would have worked a forfeiture regardless.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
BREACHES OF CONTRACT ON THE PART OF THE
JONESES WERE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR FORFEITURE.

The appellants contend that there is no evidence in
the record that Joneses failed to remove overburden. We
respectfully suggest that this is not the fact. In the sand
and gravel business the manner and care in which overburden is removed is a material factor in the preserva-:tion and perfection of the quarry. If overburden is not
removed in a proper manner it will become mixed with
the sand and contaminated so as to reduce it in quality
and grade, or in the alternative, such as ·in this case,
the overburden at one time becomes such a problem to remove in relationship to the sand to be acquired that it
becomes financially better to abandon the pit and start at
some other location, even though thousands of tons of
sand are wasted in the purocess.
Evidence as to t!he careless and negligent excavation
of sand at the expense of the owner of the property was
elicited from Isiah Rex Allen, Bry·ant S. Jones, Grant E.
Lloyd and Alvie Thorvaldson. Mr. Allen was called as a
defendant's witness. Mr. Allen testified that he was familiar with this pit, that he was also acquainted with the
Joneses and had done business with them when they were
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in Delta (R. 135). He further stated that he had been in
the concrete business himself (R. 135). Mr. Allen was acquainted with the pr.roperty and had done work for the
Joneses on the property in 1958 (R. 136). At that time
he set up his crushing plant to make gravel for road material and ready-mix and had occasion to see the condition
of the pit (R. 137), which was shortly after the Joneses
took possession. Mr. Allen drew a diagram o!f one of the
pits and stated that all of the pits were in the same COilldition, to-wit: "It was a very big area and was rmoovered
and the pits were in wonderful shape." (R. 139). H'e stated.
in 1958, at the time the Joneses took over the pits he was
able to move his sand and gravel down to his crusher by
pushing it with a dozer ,and that the bulldorzer, under 1he
circumstances the pits were in at that time, could feed
the plant ( R. 139) . Thereafter, he testified as to the condition of the pits as he saw them prior to trial while they
were still in the possession of the Joneses. His answer
was:
"Q And what do the pits look like?
A. I would hate to move in there now." * • • • (R.
140).
Q. (By Mr. Howard, continuing)
What was the
condition of the sand pit?
A. I have been in the sand pit since that time since
yesterday. I have acquired sand and gravel from the

Joneses.
Q.
A.
Q.
ment of

You mean at what time?
Between the spring of '58 and two years ago.
Have you had occasion to observe their managethe pits?
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A. Yes. I couldn't help but see the difference in
the way they managed the pit and the way Mr. Thorva.ldscm did.
Q. And what is the difference? • • • •
A. To my knowledge, they have never moved any
overburden out. They have abandoned the one great big
beautiful on account of the overburden slipping in. I'm
speaking about the home place which is there by Mr.
Thorvaldson's building.
Q. The home place is the big pit?
A. Yes.
Q. What has prevented further operation of that
pit?

Simply because the overburden wasn't removed.
Has the sand been taken out of the pit?
No. Plenty of the pit would be in good shape
if the overburden was removed." (R. 141).
A.
Q.
A.

Mr. Allen went on in detail telling about how poorly
the pits were managed and how much sluffing there was
and how much sand would be lost because of contamination and what the time and cost of removing the oerburden was (R. 142, 143). It is his estimate that it would
take at least 10 days with a D-8 Caterpillar to remove
the overburden from the big pit. Mr. Allen also testified
that there was gravel in all of the pits and that there
was sufficient gravel in the pits to run a sand and gravel
operation. Specifically in respect to the large pit, he
stated:
"Q. Mr. Allen, if you were running the pit, is there
sufficient gravel in the pit to provide for sand and gravel
operation for concrete?
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A. I would like to take it over and try it.
Q. Do you think that there is?
A. I certainly do.
Q. Do you think the gravel could be screened out
for gravel operation?
A. I would want to do some work on the topsoil
first.
Q. Yoru mean the overburden?
A. That's right. I don't say that that pit is in the
position right now to go in there and set up a ready mix
or gravel plant in there without some work ibeing done
and go ahead and try to compete with Mr. Th01rvaldson
or some other company but it could be done with a little
management ·and work."
Mr. Allen testified that no crusher would be needed
and that all that would be required was just a grizzley to
screen out the big rocks. And that the gravel coruld be
screened out of the sand sufficient to run a ready mix
business ( R. 149 150) .
Mr. Thorvaldson testified in respect to the proiblem
of the overburden, (R. 186).

He testified concerning how
dangerous and costly it would be to remove the overburden under the circumstances (R. 186.). He testified con~
cerning the quantity of gravel available for removal when
they took over the pit as compared to reduction of the
Pit as it then stood at the time of trial (R. 187). Mr.
':Dhorvaldson testified concerning what the Jones' oper~
ati<m has done to the sand and gravel in detail (R. 189).
Mr. Grant E. Lloyd testified that the big pit was in
bad shape at the time of the trial and that the overbur~
den was hanging over the edge, that they have excavated
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the pit in such a manner as to prevent getting the overburden off of a portion of the sand and that the location
of the o·v·erburden in respect to that sand has eliminated
tl1e use of a few thousand yards of the sand and that if
it Wl~n..~ not impossible to get the overburden off because
of the danger to a caterpillar operator, that it would in
any event be "awful expensive to get in there and try to
gP! the overburden off of there." (R. 245, 246, 247). He
said this condition prevailed on all the pits that the J oneses
were operating and that the Joneses would merely operate a pit until no further sand or gravel could be taken
out of it without effort and then move to another pit and
Pxhaust it. All of the pits have been left in a poor condition (R. 247, 248).
To say that no proof was elicited concerning the mismanagement of the pit and the status of the ovevburden
is to ignore tens of pages. The court properly found that
the overburden was poorly and inadequately removed
and constituted a breach of the contractual provision
which stated: "If the Lessees fail to operate the business in a proper businesslike and workmanlike manner
and/or fail because of business practices to keep up with
the demand, the same will constitute grounds for forfeiture of this lease." (Emphasis added.) The court will
note the disjunctive use of "and/or." This language
clearly shows that if the Lessees fail to operate the business in a proper businesslike and workmanlike manner
that forfeiture would be the proper remedy. The evidence that has been submitted in respect to the failure to
remove overburden in a workmanlike manner we believe,
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contrr..ry to the statement of the Appellants, has been
proven by oompetent evidence.
Appellants make the same gross charge in respect to
the court's finding that the Joneses failed to make sales
slips fm~ material sold reasonably soon after sale and delivery of the material to customers and that they failed
to account for sand and gravel stockpiled and removed
from the premises. To say that there wasn't evidence
in this respect is to ignore the fact. The Respondent called
as a witness Mr. Leon Woodfield, a Certified Public Accountant and Professor of Accounting at the Brigham
Young Unive,rsity. Mr. Woodfield testified that he made
an audit for a six-month period from January 1st through
June 30th, 1962. Mr. Woodfield was the second accountant
employed by Mr. Thorvaldson to make an audit. There
had been one previous audit, which also found discrepancies (R. 127. R. 190). Mr. Woodfield testified that on
the basis of the books kept by the J oneses he was unable
to determine whether all of the sales were recorded or
not. His answer was:
"Q. You couldn't tell whether all the sales were recorded?
A. No, because of the state of the records, there
was no way of determining if all sales had been recorded.
There was nothing to tie them into other than the document that was there. I have no way of knowing if a sale
of gravel was sold but not recorded.
Q. Did you have occasion to look at the accounting
records to determine whether adequate Accounts Receivable or the cash receipts record were maintained so
that you could cross-eheck them?
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To my knowledge the Accounts Receivable is not
complete and the sales of cash receipts is not in such a
fashion for me to check that. I was mainly interested in
the sales area, but in connection with this, in examining
the sa!es documents and in discussion with the Jones
people, I was unable to find these records." (R. 126).
A.

He stated that the J oneses took their personal living
out of the till and made no accounting for the money that
came in or left; and consequently, it was impossiJble to
tally sales made with cash received or sales slips (R. 128).
He also testified that the majority of the sales invoices
were unsigned by the customer; and, consequently, there
was no verification that the sales ticket conformed with
the quantity delivered on the sales tickets that they did
have (R. 128). He further testified ·that the invoices
dw·ing the audit period were nort in numerical sequence.
He stated that they jumped back and forth indicating
that they were not made at the time of the sale (R. 129).
His records disclosed that even by the sales slips kept
by Mr. Jones that he had failed to account for 1,087.83
yards of material sold for which he owed Thorvaldson a
royalty (Exhibit No. 23). Mr. Jones himself testified
that they did not make the sales slips out as the sales
were made, that he relied upon memory in making sales
slips or relied upon somebody telling him of the sale that
was made (R. 171).
Under the circumstances of these facts the court
could do nothing more than conclude that the J oneses failed
to maintain ordinary business records by which Thorvaldson could make an audit to verify the royalties that
were being paid. Even an audit, although of great ex-
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pense to Thorvaldson, would not establish the truth or
falsity of the accounting tendered because of the defective record keep·ing of the Jones'. The whole basis for
payrnent as established by the contract was upon quantity sold, which necessarily implied that the lessee would
maintain proper methods of accounting. This failure to
keep records was a breach of the contract provisions requiring the Lessees to keep books accessible to the Lessor
for the purpose of computing the output of marketed sand,
gravel and dirt at all times. It further breached the cootract pro~ision requiring them to operate the business in
a "businesslike" manner.
The contract required, as determined by the amended
decree, that "the defendants are ordered to pay a royalty
of 25c per ·cubic yard for all topsoil, sand or gravel processed on, or produced from, the premises leased by the
plaintiffs to defendants and disposed of on the market."
The accounting record shows that they did not pay a royalty on at least 1,087 yards that weTe sold during the
year ending June 30th, 1962, and based upon accounting
extension, probably an equal amount for the years previous thereto. The record further discloses that the
. J oneses had removed hundreds of yards of sand and other materials and stockpiled it on their own property, for
which they paid no royalty. Mr. Lloyd testified that, in
.his opinion, 1500 yards or so were stockpiled and unpaid
for (R. 25·5).
The record discloses that by Mr. Thorvaldson's own
tally sheet of cement deliveries that he norted, the Jooeses
purchased during the accounting period sufficient cement
to make 2800 yards of concrete (R. 194). Since the ce-
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mt•nt added is offset by the weight (R. 163) all of the
material that went into the concrete of 2800 yards should
havP come from the Thorvaldson pit, although during
the same period of time he was paid for 1140 yards (R.
194).
It is further shown by the record that the J oneses had
no way of estimating accurately the amount of gravel
and sand obtained from Thorvaldson as distinguished
from the amount of gravel and sand taken from the Summit Creek Irrigation Company and/or Santaquin City.
Their method of handling the sand and gravel was to
dump them in separate piles and assume thart all of the
material in the Thorvaldson pile was sand and that all
of the material in the other pile was gravel, although admittedly, (R. 160) both piles contained sand and gravel
for no screening was used. On the basis of the two stockpiles they paid Mr. Thorvaldson for sand processed at the
ratio of three quantities for every seven quantities used
of the material obtained elsewhere. This is understandable, for the material that was being obtained elsewhere
was costing them 7c a yard as distinguished from 25c
that had to be paid Thorvaldson. Whether they used
three-tenths of a yard of ~horvaldsons or four-tenths or
nine-tenths is unknown, except by the estimate of Mr.
Jones (R. 159, 160, 161). The only time that they make
a record of the quantities sold that belong to Thorvaldson is at the end of the quarter when they calculate how
many yards of concrete they have sold and then determine that three-tenths of that quantity was sand and
gravel taken from the Thorvaldson pit for which they
owe Thorvaldson 25c per yard (R. 161).
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For the court to conclude that this method of accounting was less than accurate and highly speculative,
and certainly nort a record kept in a businesslike manner, was justifiable. It is further obvious, and apparently
the court believed, that by this method the Joneses had
failed to account to Thorvaldson for sand and gravel removed from his property and sold.
It is interesting to note that the Joneses moved their
sand and gravel operation from the premises of Thorvaldson for the purpose of getting financial advantage.
Mr. Jones has testified that he obtained sand and gravel
from the Sumnrit Creek Irrigation Company for 7c a
yard (R. 173) , and from Acord and Oldroyd for lOc a

yard. The record containing his statement as to the
amount that he paid Acord and Oldroyd is in the poction of the transcript not printed for the court, hOIWever,
since the Appellant has not seen fit to print that portion
of the transcript, it would seem authoritative to set forth
the fact in this brief. By the interpretation placed on the
agreement by Joneses, every yard of material that could
be obtained from anyone orther than Thorvaldson saved
the Joneses morey. This is the reason that they moved
off the property so as to circumvent the court's decision
wherein the decree required them to pay on material
"processed" on the property. Their conduct in moving
from the premises was not only a breach of contract, but
an act of bad faith, for their contention at the prior trial
was that the consideration was not illusory because they
were required to get all of their material from Thorv·aldson. Their statements to the court in that instance apparently were for expedience.
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POINT III
THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT THE
GRAVEL FROM
OTHER THAN THE LEASED PREMISES, WHEN THE
LEASED PREMISES COULD HAVE ADEQUATELY
AND SATISFACfORILY SUPPLIED THEIR NEED.
JONESES OBTAINED SAND AND

The evidence in respect to the overburden explains
that the Joneses exhausted the pits without developing
them. \Vhen the pits were exhausted for gravel purposes,
they went to a source that was more economical and
che-aper and claimed, therefore, that the Thorvaldson pits
would not supply gravel. The assertion under Point III
of the Appellant's brief is based upon the sole and selfserving assertion of Mr. Bryant S. Jones. This testimony
was in stark and diametric opposition to the testimony
of Mr. Alvie 'Dhorvaldson, Mr. Grant E. Lloyd and Mr.
Isiah Rex Allen. The transcript pages concerning their
testimony in respect to gravel availaJble out of these pits
has been set forth above.
POINT IV
THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN
ADDITOR IN AN AMOUNT SUFFICIENT TO COMPENSATE THiEM FOR THE EXPENSE OF THEIR ATTORNEY ON APPEAL.

We believe that the Supreme Court has authority
Wlder Rule 76 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to
direct the trial court to take additional testimony in respect to time and effort spent by the attorneys for the
Respondent on appeal and to modify the judgment ac-
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cordingly, or in the alternative that the Supreme Court,
in the exercise of its sound discretion, may enter judgment in accordance with corrected findings as it shall determine. The Supreme Court has heretofore announced
that there are inherent and implied powers to do just this
and the Court exercised such powers in the case of Bodon
vs. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 Pac. 2d 826.
CONCLUSION

Point 1 of the Appellant's brief raises no issue before
this court foT the reason that it is an argument addressed
to an alleged finding which the court did not in fact make.
The court did not make a finding that there was no con.sideratinn or that the consd.deration was illusory. We have
argued that po~nt because we believe that there was no
consideration. Replying to Point 1 ga:ve us an oppor·tunity to point out a basic defect in the contract, however,
even if this court found that there was consideration, it
would not affect the judgment o[ the trial court, for its
judgment was based upon breach o[ contract, and forfeiture was exacted because that was the remedy pro~ded in
the contract, and was the only satisfactory remedy at law.
The Respondents respectfully urge that the decision
of the trial court should not be lightly considered nor the
findings set aside unless there are flagrant or obvioos deects in them. We respectfully state that the findings of
the trial court are supported by substantial and real evidence and, the,refore, should not be disturbed on appeal.
See O'Gara vs. Finlay, 6 Utah 2d 102, 306 Pac. 2d 1073.
Lawrence vs. Bamberger Railroad Company, 3 Utah 2d
247, 282 Pac. 2d 335; Gattavera vs. Scheuman, 51 Wash-
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ington 2d 55, 315 Pac. 2d 649; Winnegar vs. Slim Olsen,
Inc., 122 Utah 47, 252 Pac. 2d 205. It is respectfully
recommended that the judgment be affirmed and that an
appropriate order be entered for the award of additional
attorneys fees to the Respondents.
Respectfully submitted,

JACKSON B. HOWARD, for
HOWARD & LEWIS
290 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah

Attorneys for Respondents
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